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Gamesmanship, third parties and arbitration: 
reflecting on the paradigm of PPP disputes 
 
Dimitrios Athanasakis (∗ )     
  
Synopsis 
Disputes occurring in PPP projects pervade three interfacing levels of agreements: 
internal, downstream, and peripheral. PPP disputes have been free from arbitral 
dispute resolution and their legal environment is uncertain and deregulated. While 
project partners appear to have a natural monopoly of joining parties in the supply 
chain to their pending disputes, their decision is often driven by diversified 
expectations and conflict agendas. Analysis will investigate parameters of risk 
exposure as a business imperative of the parties’ choice of multiparty arbitration. 
Emphasis throughout is put on the game-playing capabilities of original and third 
project parties and the concomitant formulation of pairs, prior to their participation 
in a single arbitral setting. The impact of their synergistic interplay on the outcome 
of multiparty arbitration is also explored. The aim is to test the responsiveness of 
English law and institutionalised practice to the idiosyncrasies of PPP disputes. The 
results of this study seek to conceptualise multiparty arbitration as part of the 
parties’ informed business plans and alert legal researchers and industry 
practitioners to workable institutional arrangements. 
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I. Introduction 
Multiparty arbitration for PPP (Public Private Partnerships) disputes is an area of 
emergent practice interest. The set up of new contracting SPV (Special Purpose 
Vehicle) schemes has necessitated dynamic corporate choices regarding risk 
allocation and cashflow returns. But very little academic attention has been paid to 
the legal framework of the ensuing disputes. While claims which concern multiple 
parties increase with a depressing regularity, multiparty arbitration is treated by 
project parties with great circumspection. Part of the reason is that the competitive 
advantages at the varying project phases are not readily identifiable. Moreover, 
legal academics have overrated the importance of consensualism and 
underestimated the business imperatives of this procedural mechanism. 
The following analysis addresses this scholarly gap with a view to pursuing two 
interwoven objectives. First, focus is shed on the perception of risk in its multi-
faceted legal, economic, market, and political aspects.  This paper advocates that 
this perception impresses upon the parties’ decision to invite third parties to enter 
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into an arbitration setting. Second, the ‘game-playing’ theory is conducive to the 
formulation of synergies among parties and the arbitrator’s level-playing field. This 
theory distils the idiosyncratic and reactive features of arbitration. Therefore, 
discussion concentrates on the essence of the economics and business decisions, as 
an indicator of success, other than the parties’ request for legal remedies and 
fairness. Indeed, project parties will be geared towards using multiparty arbitration 
where payment mechanisms proved weak in the currency of the construction 
project, or where they seek to gain some economic benefit. Analysis does not 
extensively touch upon the procedural bounds and the law on joinder.  
Research on the paradigm of PPP disputes will conclude that arbitration 
encapsulates some legitimate synergistic interplay. Parties in large projects are 
faced with decisions and consistent use of multiparty arbitration is the ultimate 
proposition. Legal and construction researchers and practitioners now venturing in 
the field will benefit from insightful topical observations that reflect upon the merits 
and demerits of joinder. They can then energise legal and institutional draftsmen to 
re-invent joinder as a positive agent for large-scale disputes.  
II. Overview of PPP contractual arrangements 
The set up of PPPs is indicative of an extroverted investment environment, where 
the State and private parties are joint developers for public works projects. Their 
alliance has created a unique blend of contractual arrangements with a plethora of 
legal, regulatory and political elements considered therein. In this institutional 
framework, strong negotiation and entrepreneurial capabilities are needed in order 
to integrate sponsorship, construction and operating risks and interests. The market 
take-up and competition amongst private developers has resulted in the upgrade of 
the State’s game-playing role.  
Private and public sector are under extreme pressure to make dynamic choices 
regarding contractual, corporate and dispute resolution instrumentalities. With an 
increase of the number of players in the economy, construction consortia are 
parochial to face up to the new risk profile and the symptomatic rivalries and 
tensions. In modern engineering projects, the project company/ SPV (Special 
Purpose Vehicle) is a centralised contractual and corporate planner with 
‘generalisable’ features. This sets out to promote efficiency within a contractual, 
legal and regulatory framework. In essence, this is a financial and marketing device 
where the upstream concession agreement, downstream interface construction and 
operation contracts, and peripheral financial agreements converge. In law, the SPV 
can be an unincorporated joint venture or a société anonyme for civil law 
jurisdictions, with a pre-defined contractual life i.e. its dissolution will occur at the 
expiration of the concession agreement at the latest. Further to this, there are no 
‘back to back’ and mutually enforceable obligations between the Grantor and third 
parties. Contractors, sub-contractors and operators are kept at arm’s length from the 
SPV. 
In modern project management, the SPV is an integrated and attitudinal structure. 
Engineering and consulting companies, syndicate of investment banks (financiers), 
state agencies are horizontally integrated in the SPV, in order to co-ordinate project-
phases, the division of works, and the management of arising disputes.  The lack of 
a binding structural and risk-division framework denotes that the parties’ 
responsibilities will remain integral, no matter who bears the risk. Therefore, there 
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is a binding risk assumption and undertaking. If there is a cost overrun or underrun, 
then all partners share this.  
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Figure 1: Indicative diagram displaying possible PPP contractual arrangements 
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or downstream parties should be avoided. The underlying ethos is that it will be 
difficult for project parties to re-establish a relationship, once a partner has resorted 
to arbitration. And parties should not include arbitration or joinder of third parties 
provisions in their contracts. In the spirit of partnership and ongoing business 
relationship, parties should be ‘reasonably collaborative’ and adopt early warning 
procedures, re-negotiation and periodical or extraordinary review processes.1 The 
impact of this protectionist legal and regulatory framework is that project parties 
will be prevented from setting forth claims against each other. This controlled 
environment also offers sufficient comfort and protection to the Grantor for not 
being faced with all sorts of claims.  
Relational contracting serves a specific game-playing concept: the number of 
players in risk management and dispute resolution must be limited. Players should 
anticipate that the behaviour of other players is based on a similar rationality to their 
own and that the actions of one player impact on other players.2 Therefore, it is very 
rare that discussions between Grantor and SPV will include the participation of 
downstream or third parties. 
The setback of relational contracting is that it is a performance management system 
which can constrain decision flexibility and sap the commitment of partners, as 
there is no duty of good faith or trust. Relational contracting at the SPV level is also 
inconsistent with the structure of downstream substantive construction and 
operation contracts, which rarely incorporate a provision for relational contracting. 
Lack of dispute resolution procedures may backfire for SPV partners, because there 
is no straightforward provision as to whether there are enforceable and direct rights 
among partners or from partners to downstream contractors. Parties in the supply 
chain are often divorced from the dispute resolution process and final outcome of an 
intra-SPV arbitration. As a result, the dispute resolution process remains 
fragmented. Certainly, where disputes arise, partners will wish to push risks in all 
different directions but share them. Still, if they have suffered substantial financial 
downfall, a multipartite dispute resolution process may offer alternative sources of 
financial recovery. In essence, unresolved conflict among partners will taint the 
work environment and protract the adversarial nature of the industry. 
III. Blurred lines: risk profile and project control 
Multiparty arbitration goes beyond typical appreciations of contract conditions, 
applicable law and the parties’ selected arbitration rules. The decision to join third 
parties is suggestive of the project parties’ perception of risk in a legal and 
regulatory context. The institutional and strategic arrangements on risks are a far 
greater determinant for the success or failure of dispute resolution, when losses 
occur. Losses stemming from PPP disputes are difficult to pin down with precision, 
because parties fail to adequately price their risks. The most prominent areas of 
disputes derive from inappropriate study, identification and accessory pricing of 
financial risks at the project implementation phase. Construction risks rank second 
in the overall PPP risk profile. 
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Financial risks have ample third-party effects and are rarely seised on the intra-SPV 
level. Throughout the project-cycle phases, SPV partners, their financial backers 
and third parties operate under different and sometimes conflicting policy bounds. 
As a general illustration of the situation, co-venturers must have adequate and 
consistent financing arrangements allowing a simultaneous flow of funds. Where 
the funding levels are not periodically reviewed, there will be no efficient and 
economic level of costs conforming to the threshold of each partners’ risk. There 
will be a substantial shortfall in the performance of the remaining project phases if a 
partner is unable to fully provide its share. Unfortunately, financing and re-
financing risks recur and may lead to lack of guarantees. Inability of the debt 
service will amount to additional guarantees, stricter supervision measures, higher 
interest rates and possible bankruptcy of a partner. Nevertheless, the remaining 
partners must cover up his share of contribution to the SPV income. Furthermore, 
lack of appropriate benchmarking will lead to adjustment of payments to the SPV 
by third-party lenders. Such financial implications will affect the level of 
competitiveness and business value of the project. The macro-economic 
environment will weigh upon the third-party lenders expectations of large cashflow 
returns and future project marketability; especially where buy out groups which are 
in speculation of taking over the business are involved.   
At the project construction phase, the incidence of financial risks will trigger 
construction risks, which are high impact risks. These occur once, they generate 
payment disputes and upset the valuation procedures under the construction 
contracts. A further manifestation of the breakdown of the payment mechanism is 
that the SPV, as Employer of the project, may cease advance payments and be faced 
with subsequent disputes with contractors at the expense of the Grantor’s interests, 
as costs and delivery time accrue. Amidst SPV-Contractors disputes, the Grantor’s 
remedies under the concession agreement are of much less value. For fear of having 
to pay back excessive sums plus interests to the lenders, if contractors go bankrupt, 
SPV partners will take a hard line with contractors, through securities packages e.g. 
bonds. In reverse, the SPV may become bankrupt and cause the subsequent step-in 
of third-party lenders and contractors.  
The Grantor’s interventionist actions can trigger the occurrence of further financial 
risks. A feature of these is where it unilaterally alters the approval procedures at the 
expense of contractors. Individual contractors may not have the capacity to 
undertake work of substantial size and complexity. When the workload exceeds the 
contractors’ capacity, and their original pricing of risks, then all sorts of risks may 
occur. Additional risks and variations will push project costs up, and lead 
contractors to seek re-negotiation of their contracts or drop out. In reverse, 
unilaterally amending the contracts and placing additional risks on contractors can 
be detrimental on SPV partners and Grantor; especially where the Contractor has 
taken on the project on a turnkey basis. He will be incentivised to price extra risks 
and activities on an autonomous basis. This re-pricing will be of potential economic 
benefit for third-party lenders who will push up their interest rates.  
The incidence of financial risks due to inadequate pricing mechanisms is more 
imminent at the operation and maintenance phases. A false use of the demand/ 
revenue ratio combined with non-anticipated changes will affect the Grantor’s 
cashflow projections. Subsequently, he may make payment deductions against the 
SPV during the operations for lack of reaching a target-level of performance. 
Driven by a ‘sovereign’ incentive, the Grantor may impose restrictions on the rate 
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of return, if the SPV’s profits are higher than anticipated. However, the Government 
cannot have the monopoly power in re-pricing these contracts. The lack of clear 
lines of responsibility and presence of over-regulation or under-regulation of 
contractual schemes affect all project parties. These will be the first who will seek 
to ensure that risks are appropriately borne by parties involved in the project. 
Therefore, the selection of arbitration is also symptomatic of a systematic review of 
the projects. 
Risks occurring at the intra-SPV level are linked with the downstream and 
peripheral third-party risks. Disputes regarding causation and liability are mainly 
founded on false perceptions about risk and bearing of losses. Ascertainment of 
losses and economic gain cannot be addressed internally at the SPV level, because it 
touches upon essential fact-finding questions derived from interfacing third-party 
arrangements. These create a common decisional thread. In particular, the link 
between SPV income issues, expenditure projections, performance revenues and 
construction costs may not be explicit, however its impact on the parties’ 
substantive rights is huge. A strong legal framework through the presence of joinder 
mechanisms will work as a fall-back and reliable recovery mechanism for parties 
who are left with the majority of financial windfall. The main risk affecting dispute 
resolution in PPP disputes is the potential problem of inconsistent liability up and 
down the contractual chain.  
In effect, the arbitrator’s response to these disputes is to assert if risks were properly 
priced and managed. The arbitrator seems to have exclusive substantive law powers. 
He may make contractual adjustments and ancillary directions in amending payment 
certificates, re-pricing contracts etc. Further determinations relate to adjustments of 
returns or consideration of old and new equity. Therefore, selection of arbitration is 
synonymous to request for relief. Still, some parties seek remedies, while others try 
to insulate themselves from potential liability. In this context, multiparty arbitration 
will re-address the intended balances of incentives and risk-bearing between parties. 
IV. Game-playing and pairing in international arbitration 
Multiparty arbitration is a bespoke regime, a business model, where parties working 
in high-risk areas meet head on. The level-playing field is implicated by a pre-
existing environment of complex contracting arrangements, corporate structures and 
risk perceptions. Distrust among parties is strong, coupled with justified uncertainty 
about the course to follow and the final outcome. Therefore, it is not peradvertently 
clear who is definitely playing the game, i.e. who has control over the reference. In 
this hawk-dove scenario, this is dictated by a “reserved discretion” by parties with 
greater financial powers. In the face of law and institutional rules it seems to be the 
party who requests that third parties should be joined. However, the question of 
control broaches a more insightful observation of synergistic interplay.  
Although the relational features of the SPV partnership import some reciprocal 
undertaking of protecting each other from being faced with claims brought by third 
parties, in reality PPP disputes will muddle the parties’ roles. The underlying ethos 
of game-playing in PPP projects is indicative of the project parties capability of 
combining forces and exploiting their individual strengths.3 Therefore, once a SPV 
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arbitration is underway, partners will seek to pair up with third parties to fight their 
case more competently. The following schematic game-playing scenarios are 
explicit of the essence of symbiotic relationships (pairs) between multiple project 
parties before and after joinder occurs: 
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Figure 2: Game-playing scenarios with alternating pairs 
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Traditionally, the power to order multiparty arbitration has hinged on ‘common 
questions of law and/ or fact’. While this is the crux of the procedural foundations 
of the regime, its critical success factor is ‘commonality of interests’ among project 
partners. Indeed, there is a conventional view that SPV partners have common 
dispute resolution interests. For SPV partners, there is a certain gain to reach out to 
third parties. They cannot have greater liability to main contractors, sub-contractors, 
operators than their liability to the Grantor. Thus, the main reason that SPV partners 
open up the intra-SPV arbitration arena to third parties is that they may hold a 
liability which can be recovered from upstream or downstream parties. Therefore, 
SPV partners and third parties invited to be joined in PPP disputes will engage in a 
specific cost-benefit exercise: if joinder increases their chance of payment, 
compared to their expected profits from the capitalisation of the concession. If 
project construction-phase has been completed, parties may consider raising sums 
through operation profits and not multiparty arbitration. If, however, these gains are 
less than the ones anticipated in multiparty arbitration, then the decisional thread 
changes. This equation further reveals that project parties price their risks and make 
subsequent claims on an excessive basis, with a view to eliminating financial 
exposure or increasing their economic gains. The basis of calculating expected 
monetary value of claims is a key factor in construction disputes. Claims built on 
PPP disputes tend to be of excessive value.   
Political reaction to multiparty arbitration may be intense. A Government would 
wish to avoid arbitration altogether for fear of becoming politically accountable. Its 
participation in multiparty arbitration may be viewed as a move to destroy domestic 
contractors involved in the project.  It may seek re-negotiation of disputes in the 
alternative. Nevertheless, the counter-incentive for the Grantor is that there would 
be a single point of reference for claims and communications. It will further be 
presented with the opportunity to screen the ‘extended’ claims environment and 
resist the trial of frivolous and inappropriate claims. Furthermore, favourable 
awards stemming from joinder will be directly enforceable against downstream and 
third parties.   
There is a wide range of interrelated issues and themes that cut across the PPP 
contractual decision and arising claims are plentiful. The determination of these 
issues will import legal arguments with a factual background which may wholly or 
partly substantiate a claim. Joinder of third parties will convey the necessary 
information quickly and effectively. Written communications and pleadings 
exchanged in the multiparty arbitration will be readily available to all parties. The 
third parties’ claims will add more compelling claims and cross-claims for SPV 
partners.  
Therefore, parties often cause joinder in order to get a specific procedural 
advantage: amend their claims and bring these under a different contractual basis  
with a view to enhancing recovery. While, parties may ‘claim under’ different 
contracts, joinder has the added incentive that it prevents partners from ‘claiming 
over’ in separate arbitrations. Also, where their claims converge, they will benefit 
from proportionate allocation of advance on institutional costs. The challenge for 
multiparty arbitration is that legal, contractual and regulatory remedies will be 
sorted by a common and single arbitrator or tribunal. The game-playing feature of 
this is that contractual dispute resolution through international arbitration may 
invite considerations of remedies of ‘otherwise applicable law’ and the bringing in 
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of regulatory remedies, which were previously unavailable for some project parties. 
Therefore, the outcome of international arbitration can be materially different, when 
third parties are joined. Indeed, claims may be further substantiated by another 
contract, or statute [and applicable law] that governs another contract. Still, 
repetition of claims is avoided and unsubstantiated claims cannot succeed in other 
arbitration venues. Issues will not be re-opened and will be decided in a final and 
binding way.  
Multiparty arbitration does not come clean off risks and game-playing may not be 
entirely consistent with the project. The joinder mechanism may naturally break 
down, following a settlement of a set of claims. Partners of the SPV, once 
multiparty arbitration is underway may rather compromise their claims with 
downstream contractors or other parties, if the cost-benefit equation shows that 
there will be excess gains from future operation of the project. Adverse financial 
market conditions may further push SPV partners to settle their cross-claims. 
Indeed, the threat of multiparty arbitration may can be turned into a creative 
opportunity for the resolution of disputes. But, where a pair of parties reach a 
settlement of their claims, the arbitrator is not entitled to use this in ascertaining 
liabilities and calculating losses under separate arbitrations. 
Procedural fairness will become an issue in game-playing and how the level-playing 
field of arbitration can be less incumbent upon the above parties. But, parties will 
have different perceptions about procedural fairness. However, the delimitation is 
‘reasonableness’. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to set forth 
their views.4 Most institutional rules of international arbitration provide that the 
arbitrator must be satisfied that the parties have had a reasonable opportunity to 
present their case.5 If at the pre-joinder phase and during the conduct of multiparty 
arbitration the arbitrator has given parties time to make statements, exchange 
pleadings and answer to claims and cross-claims, then jurisdictional challenges 
under the New York Convention, Article V(2)(b) or the EAA, Section 68 will fail. 
Still, the proposition is that multiparty arbitration instils a grounded ‘justice of 
arrangements’ appertaining to the underlying legal and factual project issues. 
V. Current trends & growing practice 
(a) Responsiveness of law and institutionalised practice 
There are few resources regarding multiparty dispute resolution for PPPs in 
England.6 So far, no court decisions or arbitral awards are known to have dealt with 
similar situations.7 The likely impact of the HGCRA (Housing Grants, Construction 
and Regeneration Act) 1996 on PPPs is solely on the adjudication provisions. 
However, the Greater London Authority Act 1999 is an indicator of regulatory 
change. This Act establishes a model scheme, the PPP Arbiter, which also treats 
multipartite issues in the London Underground PPP Agreements. The sole PPP 
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 See EAA 1996, Section 33 (1)(a). 
5
 See ICC Rules of Arbitration 1998, Article 4. See also LCIA Arbitration Rules 1998, Article 22.1. 
6
 See HM Guidance on the Standardisation of PFI Contracts (SoPC 3), dated 29.03.2004. This 
establishes a multi-tiered procedure, providing for good faith negotiations, adjudication and finally 
arbitration.  
7
 See Midland Expressway Ltd v Carillion Construction Ltd (No.1), [2005] EWHC 2810. This case 
explains the reticence about disputes arising out of SPVs. The outcome of this case is that domestic 
law is currently unsettled regarding these disputes and that some strong and concise legislative 
framework should be in place. 
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Arbiter is independent of the Government and of PPP parties. Its mainstream role is 
to review projects. But, the Arbiter gives only guidance and directions and not 
binding decisions. This means that aggrieved parties will either resort to English 
Courts or international arbitration thereafter.  
There is an ever-present need for English arbitration law to live up to the new PPP 
institutional and regulatory environment and retain its frontrunner position in 
international construction dispute resolution. The starting point for change is to 
fathom the lessons from past game-playing in arbitration. From a historical 
perspective, English Judges are the founders of a standardised multiparty arbitration 
practice. In the pre-EAA 1996 era, where the parties’ contracts contained joinder 
provisions, and signatory parties refused to participate therein, a party could bring 
an action requesting the Official Referee to establish an alternative multipartite 
court procedure and block a pending biparty arbitration to which he was party.8 
Normally, Judges would admit such requests; by analogous application of the 
judicial ‘High Court third-party proceedings’ mechanism. This practice reflected a 
systematic pre-1996 attitude to promote the basic integrity of the process and hold 
the parties to their agreements.9  
The levels of judicial intervention in construction arbitrations were much higher 
than any other type of arbitration. Other than being explicit of the Judges’ exclusive 
game-playing capabilities, these levels reveal that the standards for a more solid 
level-playing field in construction arbitrations are higher. While this Court attitude 
for domestic multiparty arbitrations was plausible, presumptions about the 
intentions of the parties’ were far fetched. Yet the practice of multiparty arbitration 
worked well. A new generation of arbitration scholars has challenged the forcible 
powers of Judges in arbitration and advocated regulation of arbitration by the 
parties and not Judges or arbitrators.10 The conceptual framework of game-playing 
in joinder provisions has changed with the passing of the EAA 1996. The most 
prominent feature of modern English arbitration law is the exclusion of judicial 
supervision over domestic and international arbitration.11  
As the law currently stands, the exclusive game-players in the selection and set up 
of multiparty arbitration (consolidated or concurrent arbitral hearings) are the 
parties.12 The current arbitral orthodoxy is “power to the people”. However, the 
EAA is not entirely suitable for international arbitrations under PPP schemes. It 
does not address the terms of such consolidation to take place nor does it provide 
any fall-back de-consolidation mechanism in case multiparty arbitration collapses. 
Furthermore, no mention is made to alternative multipartite arrangements i.e. 
‘name-borrowing’ of ‘arbitration for the benefit of the sub-contractor’ arbitrations 
which can be used for PPP dispute resolution.13 The arbitrator’s powers are 
mentioned in a negative and not restorative way. Interestingly, domestic CIMAR 
(Construction Industry Model Arbitration Rules) 2005 give more credence to the 
arbitrator’s powers. The arbitrator will order joinder, “if he considers it 
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 See Trafalgar House Construction (Regions) Ltd v Railtrack Plc, 75 B.L.R. 55. 
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See
 old JCT 80 Building Contract, Article 5 and Clause 41B. 
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 See Lew, J D M, Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, (1986). 
11
 See EAA, Section 1 (c).  
12
 See EAA, Section 35. 
13
 For an insight into these arrangements see Northern Regional Health Authority v. Derek Crouch 
Construction Co. Ltd., [1984] Q.B. 644 and Mooney v Henry Boot Construction Limited, [1996] 80 
BLR 66. 
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appropriate”.14 The ICE (Institution of Civil Engineers) Arbitration Procedure 1997 
(7th Edition) places an equal decisional weight to the arbitrator and the original 
parties.15 The LCIA Rules take a step further: the joinder request is automatically 
available to third parties.16 However, they do not foreclose gamesmanship of 
parallel actions. Also, they leave the essential question of time for joinder request 
untouched. Furthermore, the current structure of the ICC Rules of Arbitration 1998 
implicates the users’ perceptions about the joinder mechanism. Especially, because 
these rules are tied to the concept of strictly two procedural camps: ‘claimant and 
respondent’. The ICC Rules do not contain any corresponding provision pertinent to 
the formulation of multiple pairs, as previous explicated in Figure 2, and leave the 
issue of multiparty arbitration entirely upon the parties’ choice, goodwill and co-
operation. Nevertheless, in the absence of such co-operation parties will become 
entrenched.  
There is a tricky compromise of decisional powers in the ICE and LCIA Rules. Yet, 
it is not entirely clear who is definitely playing the game. Nevertheless, the 
draftsman mindset is geared towards certainty of procedure, which is an explicit 
gain for the parties and arbitrator. Equalising the roles of parties and arbitrators in 
the joinder decision offers the added incentive that the number and scope of claims 
will be delimited and the organisational route will be agreed and straightforward. 
As a result, time, costs and effort are saved. The current legal and institutional 
landscape regarding the decisional weight of the parties and arbitrator’s pull for 
multiparty arbitration is unique, but unresponsive. While for parties and advocates 
this weeds out a deeper question of the ‘right’ selection of applicable rules, the 
above joinder provisions do not prod parties and arbitrators into timely action. This 
gap will allow opportunistic parties to bring subsequent jurisdictional challenges, 
where they anticipate that the progress and outcome of multiparty arbitration are 
likely to be unfavourable to them.  
(b) Arbitration for PPP disputes & developing perspectives 
The passing of the EAA 1996 established consistency of English arbitration law for 
domestic and international arbitration as well as alignment with counterpart 
developed laws. Unfortunately, the past fruits of multiparty arbitration are not 
reflected in the new statute. International arbitration in England and the new 
institutional challenge for PPP disputes can benefit from past court practice. 
Departing from the paradigm of PPP disputes, a deeper revision of the law and 
practice must be effectuated to be ahead of future developments.  
Commensurately, greater clarity is needed in the joinder decision specifics. Some 
legal and institutional development should be directed to bestow the arbitrator with 
powers to decide which parties, amongst those named in the joinder request, should 
be joined. And some arrangements should be made, regarding the degree of 
proportionality of submitted claims. The challenge for joint dealing of disputes in 
PPP projects is that issues of legal, contractual political and regulatory character can 
be very difficult to separate. Indeed, there is a high commercial and legitimate 
pressure on the arbitrator regarding the link of disputes. The question is how much 
is enough? A portion? This gap in law could be bridged by provision for partial 
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consolidation.17 But the decisional weight on the amount of disputes which should 
be submitted, must exclusively lie with the parties. The arbitrator is obligated by his 
mandate to deal with all claims set forth by the parties, irrespective of the needed 
workload, especially where his subsequent directions and awards must be reasoned. 
However, some time-limits must be in place, for otherwise multiparty arbitration 
could drag on interminably and subvert its underlying procedural economy ethos. 
The dealing with claims that arose after the set up of multiparty arbitration should 
rest with the arbitrator’s sole judgment.18   
At an organisational level, one of the most prominent features of PPP contracting is 
enhanced leadership and business judgment. The mastering of PPP disputes will 
require of the arbitrator such qualities. A ‘structured approach’ is desirable for the 
arbitrator’s responsiveness to the parties’ claims. The arbitrator should invite the 
parties at a pre-trial meeting to express their views and produce short statements 
regarding the joinder question and the issues to be resolved. In view of the 
information gathered, the arbitrator should produce a working programme. This 
information should be apposite to the questions of link of losses, claims and risks. 
At this stage, the appointment of a legal or technical expert is unnecessary. If there 
are any gaps in information, the arbitrator can request the parties’ for further 
clarifications. If at a prolonged stage, parties have not progressed and still speculate 
on multiparty arbitration, the arbitrator should make directions approving or 
rejecting joinder. This may be by way of award on jurisdiction. 
As an alternative working arrangement, modern contract negotiators should rethink 
the adoption of ‘name-borrowing’ provisions. The English Court precedent of 
name-borrowing arbitrations can be appropriated for an emerging multipartite 
practice. Where main contractor has a claim against the Grantor (or vice versa), he 
may borrow the ‘name’ of the SPV and claim against the Grantor. In exchange, he 
pays the SPV some monies as security. There are several striking points with this 
arrangement. The arbitrator in the Grantor-Main Contractor arbitration may find 
against the SPV and make orders against it. The backdrop of name-borrowing 
references is that the SPV has limited game-playing capabilities and control. 
However, it monitors the process and takes over where there is an imminent risk of 
derailment of the proceedings. The setback of this arrangement is that downstream 
parties could potentially obtain greater relief than the SPV is entitled from the 
Grantor. Also, they are not barred from bringing subsequent proceedings against the 
SPV. 
Ultimately, in matter of contract drafting, a joinder provision should pin down a 
properly conceived escape hatch i.e. de-consolidation. Parties are often fearful of 
losing their margin to manoeuvre once joinder occurs. This is a fall-back 
mechanism for separate arbitrations, if parties so request. The set up of multiparty 
arbitration may take up more time, cost and effort than originally anticipated. Also 
disputes take time to crystallise and the parties’ competitive advantages may 
change. But gamesmanship connotes that there should be some ‘get out’ route and 
flexibility for the arbitrator too. Provision should be made in the EAA and 
institutional provisions to allow the arbitrator to de-consolidate arbitrations.  
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VI. Closing observations 
There are two conceptual observations that flow directly from the previous 
discussion of gamesmanship and multiparty arbitration.  
First, the paradigm of PPP disputes has helped explore the legitimate commercial 
pressure by third parties on original parties and vice-versa for multiparty arbitration. 
This is a dispute resolution regime where parties can practice their game-playing 
skills in a controlled way. Correspondingly, PPP disputes are high-profile disputes, 
where parties apply strong entrepreneurial skill and concentrate on keeping ahead of 
the game. The outcome of this rivalry may muddle the parties’ positions: third 
parties can be the protagonists and original parties mere spectators. The further 
impact of this is that ‘original’ claims will subsequently encapsulate ‘third-party’ 
claims and expand the territoriality of the ‘single-table’ liability question. Therefore, 
parties must become more focused and serious with their claims and take 
appropriate action to tackle the decisional points at the right level-playing field. 
Game-playing is not play-acting. If their decision is based on the criterion of 
overcoming uncertainty, set up cost, and time-effective procedures, they are likely 
to succeed. 
Second, arbitration scholars may be sceptical of the level-playing field as 
contravening procedural fairness. The concepts of fairness, justice, efficiency, 
consensualism and due process are often artificially inflated in international 
arbitration. And no reliable studies exist to debate their presumed prevalence over 
sound business arrangements. Often, these concepts serve to condemn the process 
in multipartite cases, where readily informed parties seek certain remedies at an 
accessible [multipartite] venue. There is, however, a concern that the level-playing 
field should give parties the advantage of playing on equal footing and not 
adversarial grounds. However, the proposition is that the level-playing field is level, 
even if it is not equal.19 There is no compelling reason why synergies between 
arbitration participants should be viewed as unfair. The game can still be played 
fairly. Especially where a resourceful and time-bound arbitrator adopts suitable 
working arrangements regarding the treatment of claims, the hearings and the 
award-making process.  
VII. Conclusions 
The recurrent industry messages are that international and domestic arbitration must 
meet the new PPP institutional challenges and provide concrete solutions on a 
larger scale. But, whatever the legal and institutional change, parties will not stop 
playing games. Although parties form synergies, it is not the way that they prefer to 
form coalitions. They do so because multiparty arbitrations are too large and 
complex for them to fight alone. There is a wide variation in the manner synergies 
are formed and determined by the competitive advantages and the attitudes of 
project parties. An effective multiparty arbitration needs a positive client attitude. 
Present discussion may, of course, give ground for a fresh concentration of 
academics and practitioners on business issues, rather than debates on overworked 
theoretical questions.   
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